【主讲】刘焱 美国普渡大学管理学院博士生

【主题】On the Timing and Depth of a Manufacturer’s Sales Promotion Decisions with Forward-looking Consumers

【时间】2009-12-3（周四）13:30-15:00

【地点】清华经管学院舜德楼101

【语言】英文

【主办】市场营销系

【简介】

This paper investigates a manufacturer’s optimal timing and depth of price promotions over a planning horizon in a frequently purchased packaged goods context. Promotion policy is the equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game between consumers and the manufacturer. Consumers form expectation over future promotions and strategically time their purchase to coincide with the manufacturer’s promotion events. The forward-looking manufacturer takes this consumer behavior into account and dynamically evaluates promotional response of consumers in each choice segment based on their inventory levels when making optimal promotion decisions