【主题】商业银行的信用周期

【主讲人】和平

【时间】 2:30 pm四月二十七日

【地点】 伟伦楼508

【语言】 中/英文

【主办】 金融系

【目标听众】博士生，硕士生以及经管学院教师

【简介】* 主讲内容、演讲者、或其他相关背景资料

Private information about prospective borrowers produced by a bank can affect rival lenders due to a "winner's curse" effect. Strategic interaction between banks with respect to the intensity of costly information production results in endogenous credit cycles, periodic "credit crunches." Empirical tests of this repeated lending game are constructed based on parameterizing public information about relative bank performance that is at the root of banks' beliefs about rival banks' behavior. Consistent with the theory, we find that the relative performance of rival banks has predictive power for subsequent lending in the credit card market, where we can identify the main competitors. At the macroeconomic level, we show that the relative bank performance of commercial and industrial loans is an autonomous source of macroeconomic fluctuations. In an asset pricing context, we find that the relative bank performance is a priced risk factor for both banks and nonfinancial firms. The factor-coefficients for non-financial firms are decreasing with size, consistent with smaller firms being more bank-dependent.

详情请点击附件：| bank credit cycles April 2007.pdf